The great GRC paradox

The article was written some time ago.

Photo courtesy of whi1e

The GRC has eluded the opposition thus far, with Francis Seow’s team of the Workers’ Party obtaining a close 49.11% margin during its contest at Eunos GRC. However, on the bright side, there were no three-cornered fights, and another brighter piece of statistic – no contestants at GRC contests has ever lost their deposits. Yet, generations of opposition candidates have avoided contesting in GRCs, intimidated by the prospects of facing off with a heavyweight PAP candidate (read Ministers), citing the ironical reason that the electoral deposits are high, and the former run the risks of losing them (when a candidate garners less than the 12.5% margin of votes, he will lose his deposits). This is what made the GRCs a great paradox.

The main reason behind the opposition’s hesitation to contest GRCs could be attributed to resource constraints, especially when the area size of the entire ward is huge. That could mean more resources would be required to totally cover the huge ground. The other reason could be due to the changing electoral boundaries, which may have put off or caught the opposition candidates off-guard that resulted in the latter ‘playing it safe’ by not contesting. And it is true that the opposition has yet to figure a way of breaking through and securing a GRC win for the first time in our electoral history. The last reason is obvious. The current strength of the opposition candidates is not sufficient enough to contest all the GRCs. During the 2006 General Elections, seven GRCs remained uncontested.

However, history and past statistics may offer a comforting voice to opposition candidates who are half-eager, half-hesitant to contest a GRC. They cannot use loss of deposit as an excuse because none has ever lost their deposit. It is an interesting trend that the single member wards are more prone to loss of deposits, partly due to the fact that such wards have seen three-cornered fights. However, the pertinent question is – why has the opposition fared better in the GRCs in terms of keeping their deposits as compared with the single member wards?

The prime reason could ironically be attributed to the re-drawing of boundaries which resulted in the absorption of ‘troubled’ (with high opposition voting proportions) into larger sized GRCs. Tiong Bahru GRC, where Mr Low Thia Khiang used to contest, and Anson where Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam first made his breakthrough were both absorbed into Tanjong Pagar GRC. Ang Mo Kio GRC absorbed the now defucnt Cheng San GRC. During the 2006 General Elections, expectations were high on Lee Hsien Loong to make history by taking a huge margin that will make his opponents lose their deposits, but little did they realize that the opposition-supporting Cheng San residents would make their point felt at the polls. While combining opposition-supportive with ruling party supportive areas will dilute the opposition votes, it could also do the same to the PAP votes. It is like combining one cup of salt solution with another cup of sugar solution. This will make the salt solution more sweet, but it will also make the sugar solution more salty. It is this “salt and sugar” combination brought about by redrawing of electoral boundaries which make the GRCs hard to win, but at the same time, it is also hard, or put more accurately, impossible to lose their electoral deposits, which is a comforting fact to the opposition fraternity.

Perhaps, the only thing that prevents the opposition from contesting in GRCs is resource constraints. It is understandable that the opposition candidates are little hesitant with regards to their approach to a GRC. However, the re-assuring part from the historical standpoint is that the odds of losing their deposits is virtually nil, although none of the opposition has ever made a breakthrough to secure one. Winning a GRC contest is difficult, and yet losing electoral deposits is also just as difficult. Hence, the great GRC paradox.