Own victim of the GRC success

This unpublished article was written some time ago with minor editing and additions being made.

Photo courtesy of whi1e

In a previous article, the PAP’s electoral strategy that takes into account the number of cabinet positions and GRC wards up for contest is being elaborated on. The basis of PAP’s strategy revolves around the strength of their minister candidates, whom are perceived as heavyweights. The ministers can in certain sense be considered the creme de la creme among the PAP candidates as reasoned by the account produced below:

“On the recommendation of Ministers, MPs, senior civil servants, corporate leaders and party activists, prospective candidates are invited to tea parties…Some are invited to a second tea session and those found suitable meet personally with… Lee Hsien Loong and then with the party whip. Those who clear the process to this point then appear before the selection committee of PAP ministers, who probe extensively into a prospective candidate’s character and motivation and ability to be a ‘team player’. After this, those still considered are interviewed by Goh Chok Tong and Lee Kuan Yew. If they agree to the selection, the candidate is given a final interview by the party’s CEC (Central Executive Committee)…Candidates are matched accordingly by their linguistic ability to a particular constituency. That means those fluent in a particular dialect will be matched into a constituency in which a certain dialect group predominates.”

That in itself is the selection criteria for an ordinary MP. The selection of a minister requires the candidate to undergo additional hurdles.

Candidates with potential to become ministers are required to undergo one-and-a-half days of psychological testing. This methodology of testing was copied over from Shell, which was used to select new executives. The test focuses on three important qualities – power of analysis, imagination and sense of reality.

– Diane K. Mauzy and Robert Stephen Milne
Singapore politics under the People’s Action Party
Routledge, 2002

Hence, from the PAP’s perspective, the typical ministerial candidate can be considered among the best of the best within their ranks, given the extensive selection hurdles that the latter has to undergo.

However, the question that remains is whether these ministerial candidates has undergone the ultimate test – to be elected by voters. Walkovers are technically not considered election by the voters. The simple answer is not all have undergone such a test.

That is where the double-edged sword of GRCs comes in. Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong admitted that the GRCs provide a platform to allow the PAP to bring young candidates into parliament, and the talented ones will go on to become ministers. The other impact that the GRC had on the nature of the electoral contest is the walkovers or non-contests faced in certain wards. Bishan-Toa Payoh, Marine Parade, West Coast, and Tanjong Pagar have not seen contests over the last two or more elections. At this stage, the following ministers, Vivian Balakrishnan, Ng Eng Hen, Lui Tuck Yew and Lim Swee Say have not undergone this ultimate test of vote by the electorate.

The question is why can the PAP end up being the victim of its GRC success? The reason is that firstly, it has resulted in non-contest at certain areas for a long time, and we cannot assume that the political capital of an unelected ministerial candidate who won in multiple walkovers in the course of more than one election will remain static. A case in point is the political capital of Goh Chok Tong. (Political capital in the context of this passage is defined as the weight of the candidate in the voters’ eyes) During the 1997 election, Goh won by virtue of a walkover at his home turf of Marine Parade GRC, but he casted himself as a ‘special candidate’ at Cheng San GRC. In other words, this strategy can be interpreted as making use of Goh’s political capital or put simply, heavyweight status to campaign at Cheng San. The result was a close fight at Cheng San. During 2006, Goh again entered into the PAP campaign at Potong Pasir and Hougang. The end result was in fact the opposite when Low Thia Khiang and Chiam See Tong did better than in 2001. Thus, has Goh’s political capital eroded? Certainly, voters at Cheng San, Potong Pasir and Hougang may agree that it has eroded. Thus, how the PAP can be the victim of the GRC success is due in part to the non-static nature of a candidate’s political capital. A ministerial candidate who has faced non-contest over a long period of time cannot be necessarily assumed to harbor a huge political capital, and in some cases have been shown to reduce with time.

The other way in which the PAP can be the victim of its GRC success, is that the younger ministers who entered parliament using the GRC route may not gain that much in terms of political capital. They entered the parliament by riding on the political capital of heavyweight ministers.

Thus, the end result would be an impending disaster on two fronts – first, the declining political capital of what is perceived to be heavyweight ministerial candidates, and second, the increasing inability of younger ministerial candidates to gain political capital. Thus, this will increasingly lead to decreasing votes for ‘heavyweight’ ministerial candidates and less votes for newer ministerial candidates. Although the opposition face the prospect of facing up to two ministerial candidates in a contest at certain GRCs, one cannot forget the double-edged sword nature of GRCs and its impact on the ability of ministerial candidates to generate votes.