This previously unpublished article was written some time ago.
Even Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong admitted that the purpose of GRCs is to enable the PAP to bring in young and capable candidates into parliament. According to Goh, GRCs contribute to Singapore’s political stability by ‘helping us to recruit younger and capable candidates with the potential to become ministers’.
The GRC whilst being an advantage to the PAP has been the bane of the opposition. When faced with the daunting aspect of squaring off against a heavyweight PAP candidate, who is usually a cabinet minister, the opposition would avoid contesting the ward, for fear of a heavy loss to the tune of losing their deposits. Thus, the opposition tended to contest single member wards and other GRCs perceived to yield better returns. During the last elections, there were 9 single member wards, all of which were contested by the opposition. 9 single member wards constitute a mere 11% of the sum total of 84 seats. Earlier this year, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong announced that the 6-member GRCs will be reduced to no more than 5, but they will still stay, while there will be an addition of of 3 single member wards to make up a total of 12, which constitute 14% of the total number of seats. Even if they are all taken up by the opposition, it would still not pose a sufficient level of threat to the PAP’s dominance, although it will create consternation amongst the PAP’s ranks.
Most would agree with the advantage that the GRC poses for the PAP’s ranks, where 89% (or 86% if 3 single member wards are added to the current 9 making a total of 12) of the seats can be decided by contests or non-contests resulting in walkovers in 14 GRC wards. The part about heavyweight candidates anchoring GRCs and holding fort deterring opposition candidates is generally true, but that is only the tip of the iceberg; a small jigsaw within the larger picture of the PAP’s electoral strategy as perceived in this article.
The PAP’s electoral strategy with regards to its approach is based on one assumption – the anchoring candidate who is usually the cabinet minister that will pull in votes and deter the opposition from contesting at the ward. This means that all GRCs will be anchored by a cabinet minister. With this assumption in mind, let’s look at the larger picture of our current ministerial cabinet. For starters, we have to begin by counting the number of cabinet ministers. The current count of cabinet ministers stands at 21.
This figure of 21 cabinet ministers alone may not tell much, but we have to see it in combination with the number of current GRCs at 14. In all likelihood, 14 cabinet ministers from the list of 21 will helm PAP’s challenge at 14 GRCs, which will leave a buffer of 7 ministers.
This buffer of 7 ministers could pose further problems for the opposition. Why is this so? The simple explanation is that instead of facing one heavyweight cabinet minister, the opposition could be up against two, which could potentially deter them from contesting. Mathematically speaking, for a extremely ‘troubled’ GRC that could very well tip into the opposition’s hands, the PAP can afford to send Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong plus two (three if the ward is a six member one) other ministers to contest, but that is unlikely to happen as it would mean putting all the eggs into one risky basket.
Skimming through the GRCs, some of them already have 2 candidates who are in the current cabinet. Bishan-Toa Payoh GRC has two current cabinet members in Ng Eng Hen and Wong Kan Seng. Tanjong Pagar GRC has Lee Kuan Yew and Lui Tuck Yew. And more worrying for Workers’ Party who has set its sights on Aljunied GRC, the two cabinet ministers are Lim Hwee Hwa and George Yeo. It is coincidental that Lim was made full cabinet minister earlier this year, which means that the Workers’ Party will be up against two heavyweight candidates if they contest Aljunied.
Thus, how the GRC fits into the picture of PAP’s electoral strategy is that the current number of such wards in relation to the number of cabinet positions allows for a sufficient buffer of cabinet ministers, who could be deployed at any point of time to boost the challenge at any GRC where the opposition is deemed to mount the strongest challenge. Is it any wonder that the Workers’ Party A team could be facing more than one cabinet minister if it intends to contest Aljunied again during the next elections? Ditto for the opposition who intends to contest Bishan-Toa Payoh.
First, let me point out that the electoral law for change in GRC makeup has not been passed, there’s no guarantee it will be passed before next election, unless PAP wants to postpone election further to 2011.
it doesn’t matter how many ministers they got, not all are of the same weight. even those heavyweight have not been tested for many years, do they still command the same support. i doubt so as demographics change.
Dear Cy:
You have a point. This is where people like us disagree with the PAP. I have been looking at certain speeches from the PAP camp, and they seem to perceive that cabinet members carry more weight that non-ministers. Even LKY said during the Kent Ridge Ministerial forum something to the effect about how ministers-to-be are put through certain tests, additional tests and all that. As far as the PAP views things, ministers carry more weight.
But you are right. Ground sentiments may differ. Probably the oppo shouldnt be intimidated by the fact that they are facing 2 ministers. Those that are contesting Bishan-Toa Payoh and Aljunied should be prepared for the prospect, and they shouldn’t be intimidated.
Sincerely yours
I have 3 issues with this analysis.
1. Not all ministers are heavyweight. Ministerial positions don’t confer weight by virtue of the post. Heavyweights are usually the seasoned and high ranking ones.
2. History shows that it is not easy for any candidate to lose his deposit where 2 candidates or teams of candidates face off against each other. That usually happens where there are more than 2 candidates. The third candidate will find out who else is standing there on Nomination Day and can simply refuse to proceed to submitting his nomination before 12pm to avoid losing his deposit.
3. In your example of a troubled GRC, you assume the PAP can move their candidates at will to deal with it. However, the PAP are incumbents in most seats. Everyone knows where they will be, and generally also who is moving to another constituency because the new guy is usually introduced to the grassroots team in advance (even if it’s only weeks in advance). On the other hand, only on Nomination Day will people know which opposition candidates will show up to contest which ward. And only during campaigning after Nomination Day will they find out where the trouble is, because relying on grassroots leaders to detect trouble in advance leads to notoriously wrong conclusions such as “the ground is sweet”. For these reasons, I’d say it is extremely difficult for PAP to carry out your ultra-defense tactic even if they wanted to.
Yes, contrarian, I agree with all your points. The thing is that how the PAP sees things is different from the way we see things. Their GRC and ministerial cabinet is linked.
I also do not believe that all ministers carry the same weight. I have written an article sometime ago about that but I have to look it up.
Some perceived heavy-weight cabinet ministers are in fact, doing nothing but weighing down the PAP team. Mah Bow Tan comes to mind.
Hahahaha yeah he lost to Chiam at Potong Pasir!
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