This unpublished piece was written some time ago.
Photo courtesy of Stinkee Beek
A piece of Singapore parliamentary elections history question to all of you readers:”Elections results and contesting candidates aside, what is another difference between the close contest at Cheng San GRC in 1997 and that of Aljunied GRC in 2006?
The answer may not be obvious, but a big hint lies in the participation or non-participation of the then Prime Ministers in the campaigning at these ‘troubled’ GRCs, albeit from the PAP’s perspective.
Recall that during the 1997 General Elections, the then-Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong had a walkover in his Marine Parade GRC. Freed of any possible participation of a contest at his own backyard, Goh was to enter the cauldron of contest at Cheng San GRC, where he campaigned aggressively on behalf of the PAP candidates. Goh declared himself as a ‘special’ candidate of the constituency and upped the stakes by declaring that his credibility and reputation as Prime Minister was at stake during the Cheng San contest. The Workers’ Party helmed by the late Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam lost out by a close margin of 45.2% of votes.
Fast forward 9 years during the elections of 2006, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was to be kept busy when the Workers’ Party sent in what was famously known as the “suicide six” comprising new candidates in their virgin electoral contest. Unlike Goh 9 years before, Lee didn’t have the luxury of assisting the PAP campaign at Aljunied GRC. He simply had to work the ground at his own backyard of Ang Mo Kio GRC. Expectations from the PAP camp were high and Lee was expected to romp to victory, only for the latter to fall short of expectations set by his party mates when he secured 66.14% of the votes.
Thus, this other difference between Cheng San 1997 and Aljunied 2006 shows us the utility of what is known as ‘electoral suicide squads’ in keeping the bigwigs busy defending their own turf and reducing the likelihood of them aggressively campaigning at troubled GRCs. Hence, an interesting food for thought will be – will the Workers’ Party win Cheng San GRC if a suicide squad was sent to Marine Parade GRC to keep Goh busy in defending his own turf? Or alternatively, if no suicide squad was sent to Ang Mo Kio GRC, Lee would surely aid his party counterparts at Aljunied and what would such have on the impact of the results?
There are a few bigwigs whom some believe have the credibility and reputation to win support at other GRCs if they happened to assist their party mates’ campaign. Thus, it would take more than one ‘suicide squad’ to keep them busy in defending their own turf. Already, online observers and commentators are suggesting such squads to be sent to places like Tanjong Pagar, Marine Parade and Ang Mo Kio.
The next question is will the contest against the bigwigs do the suicide squads any good? Some believe it does them the whole world of good. After all, the latter will be thrusted into immediate public limelight within the full face of the media, both mainstream and alternative. If the candidates manage their public relations aspects well, it could be a profile-booster for them in the eyes of the electorate. However, detractors feel that pitting greenhorns against bigwigs may seem a little disrespectful on the part of the opposition. True, from the sporting viewpoint as it shows a certain disregard for the calibre of the opponent by pitting the weakest competitor. But if we analyzed the results of the 2006 General Elections, the Workers’ Party didn’t suffer any ill effects of such ‘disrespect’. It also makes tactical sense be it in sports or any other similar contest to pit the weakest competitor against the strongest opponent so that other stronger competitors would have a better chance against less strong opponents. We see that in racket sports team competitions and the same concept applies in the electoral contest too. Thus, the benefits arguably outweigh the negatives.
Hence, is there any utility in electoral ‘sucide squads’? Yes, there definitely is as it reduces the likelihood of bigwig ‘special’ candidates appearing at ‘troubled’ GRCs other than their own, which may result in the swing of support towards the latter’s party.
中国历史上有名的揭示如何善用自己的长处去对付对手的短处，从而在竞技中获胜的事例。
田忌赛马——译文
齐国使者到大梁来，孙膑以刑徒的身份秘密拜见，用言辞打动齐国使者。齐国使者觉得此人不同凡响，就偷偷地用车把他载回齐国。齐国将军田忌非常赏识他，并且待如上宾。田忌经常与齐国诸公子赛马，设重金赌注。孙膑发现他们的马脚力都差不多，可分为上、中、下三等。于是孙膑对田忌说：“您只管下大赌注，我能让您取胜。”田忌相信并答应了他，与齐王和诸公子用千金来赌胜。比赛即将开始，孙膑说：“现在用您的下等马对付他们的上等马，拿您的上等马对付他们的中等马，拿您的中等马对付他们的下等马。”三场比赛完后，田忌一场不胜而两场胜，最终赢得齐王的千金赌注。于是田忌把孙膑推荐给齐威王。威王向他请教兵法后，就请他当作老师。
In my opinion, ALL opposition candidates MUST GO FOR BROKE – fight to the finish at every ward they are contesting!
It’s the same analogy applied in its entirety – when you pin them down at EVERY ward, each will have less resource to spare another. But if you only selectively pin them down at only a few wards, those not under threat will be able to reinforce those few under threat with their resources.
But, beware, faced with such a widespread challenge, the govt will resort to all means, fair and foul, such as using the ISA or other civil service resources to block and sabo the opposition. All kinds of trump up charges are not above the ruling party, as we have witnessed many a times before.
But, ultimately, it is courage and determination in the face of such abuse of power, that will win the day.
Take a lesson from Iran.
I agree with Kelvin’s position in the post.
Nice analysis. But I don’t quite understand why pitting opposition greenhorns against PM, SM or MM would be seen by people as disrespectful. By that measure, joining the opposition is disrespectful because they are opposing the party led by those 3.